A Brief Anatomy of Adjudicative
Rule-Formalism
Frank L Michelmant
I. RULE-FORMALISM

In law, there are sundry formalisms. It is "formalist" (never a
term of endearment, to my ear) to affimn the equal rights of the
rich and the poor to eat cake or to sleep under the bridges of
Paris. It is also "formalist" to think that legal-normative terms
like "contract," "liberty," "fault," and "cause" are names of intelligible essences or to pretend that the decisive legal norms for any
pending case are uniquely deducible from other norms in a logically unified normative system. None of those dubious doctrines
has been front-and-center in this Symposium. What draws the
Symposium together is a plainer-minded prompting. It is, I would
say, a pragmatic expectation of important social benefits from a
general disposition of lawmakers and adjudicators to construct
into legal norms the grammatical property of "ruleness" or formal
realizability. To distinguish this plain-minded, pragmatic formalism from the other, more extravagant kinds I mentioned at
the start, let us call it "rule-formalism." The anticipated benefits
of rule-formalism sound in democracy, efficiency, accuracy,
equality, and liberty. Compared with a law composed of vague
standards or of multiple, competing principles, a "law of rules," as
Justice Scalia has called it,' is said to score high on measures of
transparency to democratic evaluation and revision, conduciveness to both economic efficiency and moral aptness, consistency in
the application of legal coercion to various persons at different
times and places, and release from uncertainty about the law's
bearing on plans and projects.
I take rule-formalism to be a prescriptive doctrine, meant to
advise certain classes of public officials about how they ought to
manage their public powers and responsibilities. Among the intended advisees, no doubt, are drafters of statutes and regulations; as to them, the intended advice-legislative ruleformalism, as we might call it-is as clear and simple as can be:
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Make rules not standards, unless, perhaps, you have a really
pressing reason to do otherwise.
What about judges? What is the intended rule-formalist advice to them? What, in other words, is adjudicative ruleformalism? The answer is not as simple as you might think, and
in fact a bit of intellectual labor is required to unpack it fully. Noticing that none of the main papers really does this work, I offer
it as my skeptical bystander's contribution to the Symposium.
Perhaps the result will show adjudicative rule-formalism to be a
more interesting, a more venturesome, and a more problematic
doctrine than you might at first have thought.
II. POSITIVE AND IMMANENT LEGAL NORMS
A legal norm, let us say, is a judicially recognized constraint
on adjudicative decisionmaking. Legal norms can be either "positive" or "immanent." Positive legal norms are the constraints on
adjudication that judges treat as relevant to their task because
they see them as having been laid down intentionally by the acts
of certain agents whom the judges recognize as authorized to lay
down constraints on adjudication. Among such agents might be
duly constituted lawmaking bodies, but also among them might
be the parties to contracts or the makers of deeds, trusts, and
wills. Immanent legal norms are other constraints on adjudication, if there are any, that adjudicators recognize as relevant to
adjudicative work. Immanent legal norms may or may not exist
for any given judge in any given case. If there are factors and
considerations that judges treat as compelling upon their adjudications, but whose relevance for them they do not trace to the intentionally norm-declaring acts of specific agents, then those factors and considerations are immanent legal norms. For example,
a judge might feel called upon to interpret legal materials, insofar
as possible, to avoid sharply retrospective effects-not because
there is positive law against retrospectivity but because (so the
judge believes) avoidance of retrospectivity is implicit in the very
idea of legal ordering.
How does that classification apply to the adjudicative constraints that judges read out of (or read into) judicial precedents?
For our purposes here, those constraints will have to be classified
as positive legal norms. We shall have to picture each individual
judge as recognizing the collective judiciary-not only the common law judiciary but also the judiciary collectively engaged in
statutory interpretation-as a duly authorized, external, antecedently acting lawmaking body laying down the law to him or her.
We can and must extend this picture even to the case in which
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the highest court of a jurisdiction purports to make what it regards as a new rule for application to the matter right now before
it. In that case, we must say that the court has acted both as a
duly constituted lawmaking body and as an obedient adjudicator,
in that order, and that its new rule-the new precedent-has become a positive legal norm for future cases.
I don't offer these classificatory stipulations as either a true
account of how judges understand what they do or as the essence
of the best speculative jurisprudence. Rather I am forced into
them by my aim of providing a fully unfolded account of the prescriptive notion of adjudicative rule-formalism. For it is apparent,
when you think about it, that the admonitions of adjudicative
rule-formalism can apply only to those judges who are acting consciously in the presence of at least one, concededly relevant, positive legal norm. It is perhaps not impossible to imagine the opposite setting, of a tribunal set up for the purpose of handing down
unique resolutions of disputes brought before it, in a society that
obdurately refuses any semblance of general, anticipatory lawmaking-even by a tribunal binding itself as it goes along by
making precedents. In such a decidedly antilegislative setting, if
it is imaginable, the prescriptive admonitions of adjudicative
rule-formalism would be not only pointless but unthinkable. Yet
those admonitions plainly are intended to cover both common law
adjudications and those statutory adjudications (most antitrust
and civil-rights cases, for example) in which prior judicial interpretations of the governing statutes have supplanted the statutes
as the immediate source of governing norms for adjudication. It
is, therefore, necessary for us to define the category of positive (as
opposed to immanent) legal norms in such a way as to cover cases
of these kinds.

III. THE ADJUDICATIVE RULE-FORMALIST DOUBLE BIND:
MAKE No STANDARDS, SEE No STANDARDS
Adjudicative rule-formalism comprises not one but two distinct directives to judges adjudicating in the recognized presence
of positive legal norms. The first and more obvious is the exact
counterpart of the "make rules not standards" directive of legislative rule-formalism. Call it the "make rules" directive. It calls
upon judges, insofar as possible, to construe all express, positive
legal-normative materials into statements both plain in meaning
and rule-like in structure, so that, in sum, applications of them
can thenceforth be mechanical and uncontroversial. Justice
Scalia has spoken clearly and strongly for this 'make rules" aspect of adjudicative rule-formalism. He wants his Court to con-
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struct all the normative expressions in the Constitution and law
books into rules, and not leave any of them languishing in the
form of standards, even though when judges construct rules out
of standard-like constitutional or statutory language, they undoubtedly and very visibly engage in lawmaking.2
A. Exclusion of Legislative Purpose
Let us now turn to the second directive of adjudicative ruleformalism, which we can call the "only rules" directive. Consider
Larry Alexander's contribution to this Symposium. Judges, Alexander maintains, ought rigorously to treat the law as consisting only of express, positive legal norms or, in other words, to
treat the aggregation of relevant, express, positive legal norms as
all the relevant law there is. He thus frames legislative purpose
out of proper judicial cognizance. A society presumably has reasons for entrusting legislation to selected persons or bodies. A
judge might think that it is, therefore, incumbent on the judiciary
to seek the controlling norms for judicial decision in the intentions or reasons that moved the selected persons to utter certain
sentences as law, not just in the sentences themselves. On that
view, fidelity to lawmakers and society requires judges in all
cases to make fresh assessments of how the lawmaker's intentions or reasons do or do not apply to the case in question. Not,
however, according to the "only rules" directive of adjudicative
rule-formalism. That directive, to the contrary, requires judges to
suppress thoughts of that kind and limit themselves to applying
the uttered sentences straightforwardly, according to what the
sentences say, not according to why (the judges think) their
authors said it or what (the judges think) their authors intended
to accomplish by saying it.
B. The Question of Residual Positive Legal Norms
But it seems that the "only rules" directive of adjudicative
rule-formalism cannot, in all reason, stop there. Additionally, it
must require exclusion from the adjudicative purview of everything that is not either a fact of the case or an express, positive
legal norm (shaped up, insofar as the judges can do so, into the
form of a rule). That means it must exclude immanent (nonpositive) legal norms, if there are any, and also residual (as opposed
to express) positive legal norms, if there are any of those. A "reSee id at 1179-80.
See Larry Alexander, "With Me, It's All er Nuthin": Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U Chi L Rev 530 (1999).
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sidual" (as opposed to an "express") positive legal norm is one
whose content is thought to be gatherable quite apart from anything ever said about it by duly authorized lawmaking bodies.
Such a norm may nevertheless figure as a positive (as opposed to
an immanent) legal norm insofar as its status as law is thought to
depend on the lawmakers having said something about it, at least
implicitly-namely, that it is law.
Such nonexpress or "residual" positive legal norms might include "general softeners" such as equity, lenity, desuetude, and
general canons of construction. They might also include more
value-specific considerations drawn from background normative
sources such as custom, course of dealing, universalist morality,
or specific political-moral traditions such as natural law, natural
right, or the common law tradition. I suspect that most lawyers, if
they thought about it, would find themselves quite certain that
residual positive legal norms do most definitely and significantly
exist in our legal system. But whether they exist or not, it seems
that the "only rules" directive of adjudicative rule-formalism
must frame them out of adjudicative consideration. In effect, the
"only rules" directive ties back into the "make rules" directive by
requiring judges to construe express positive-legal sources (instruments and sentences) so that they do not implicitly incorporate any residual norms. They ought not, for example, incorporate
residual positive legal norms in the way that many lawyers maintain our Constitution's Due Process Clauses incorporate a specific
tradition of "natural right" or common law liberty. Why must this
be a requirement of adjudicative rule-formalism? Because residual legal norms, being by definition nontextualized or "unenumerated," are more or less bound to be cognizable, if cognizable at
all, only as standards or principles, not rules.4
Imagine a country's supreme court going about its business
of constitutional adjudication in the following way. First, it assiduously translates all the normative sentences and sentencelike expressions in the constitution to mechanically applicable
rules without remainder. For example, it reads a search and seizure clause, identical with that in our Constitution's Fourth
Amendment,5 either to prohibit warrantless searches in all cir" Consider, for example, the jurisprudence-of-principles style of the Supreme Court's
adjudications in cases such as Griswold v Connecticut, 387 US 479 (1965), Moore v East
Cleveland, 431 US 494 (1977), and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v
Casey, 505 US 833 (1992) (plurality opinion). At the end of these reflections, I shall briefly
reconsider the claim that adjudicative rule-formalism must be committed to excluding all
"unenumerated" considerations from the attentions ofjudges.
' "The right of the people to be secure in their houses, persons, papers, and effects
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cumstances or, oppositely, to mean that a warrant is not prerequisite to the legality of a search in any circumstance. Second, the
court maintains that the country's constitution, regarded as a
positive legal instrument, has injected into the country's constitutional law some "unwritten" norms from a general world tradition
of democratic constitutionalism. These additional, residual norms
include a test of "proportionality," meaning that prima facie infractions of the constitution's prohibitory rules are not illegal unless they are "not reasonably justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom.
They also include a test of "civility," meaning that governmental
acts are illegal, although contravening no express provision of the
constitution, if they deviate from "the evolving standards of decency of a maturing society.' No matter which of the two opposite, maximally rule-like readings of the search and seizure
clause our imaginary court adopts, the net result will be that
some warrantless searches are legal, some are illegal, and legality will have to depend, at least for a while, upon the application
of a highly standard-like legal test.
Over time, of course, a set of rule-like guidelines may develop
for applying the standard-like tests to certain, recurrent fact patterns. It may, or it may not, depending on the disposition of the
court. Thus in the final analysis the court in my story may or may
not end up having comported itself in the way that ruleformalists believe will reap for society the benefits of democratic
accountability, economic efficiency, moral accuracy, calculability,
and fair consistency of applications of legal force. From the
standpoint of adjudicative rule-formalism, the danger is that the
court, although rigorously following the '"make rules" directive for
the treatment of express positive legal material, will nevertheless
have failed to follow the other critical directive, the "only rules"
directive, of adjudicative rule-formalism.
From this example, we can see the following. First, the two
directives of adjudicative rule-formalism are distinct both conceptually and practically. One easily can imagine a judiciary adhering to either one without adhering to the other. Second, from a
rule-formalist standpoint, there seems little point in having either directive in force without the other.

against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause." US Const, Amend IV.
' Compare Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, § 36.
' Compare Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86, 101 (1958).
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THE CHALLENGE FOR ADJUDICATIVE RULE-FORMALISM

We are now in a position to pose some questions that might
be worthy of the attention of adjudicative rule-formalists. First,
would the exclusion from the adjudicative purview of all immanent or residual positive legal norms be a morally acceptable
practice to commend, across the length and breadth of the law, to
public officers exercising the always coercive and often punitive
force of law? Second, could the main body of society, or even of the
judiciary, possibly be brought around to agreeing that it would
be? Is the framing-out of all immanent and residual positive legal
norms a feasible aim in any legal-cultural setting now found on
earth? What are the chances that any effort to accomplish that
aim would probably fail by some substantial margin? Third, if
such an across-the-board framing-out either ought not or cannot
be completely or nearly completely accomplished, does enough
remain of the adjudicative rule-formalist project to make it worth
trying to carry out? Is the project one that would better be confined to specific areas of law? What are the applicable second-best
principles?
I don't have the answers, I'm just asking.
V. ADJUDICATIVE RULE-FORMALISM AND
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY

In his presentation at the conference for which the essays in
this Symposium were first prepared, Cass Sunstein doubted
whether disputes over adjudicative rule-formalism can sensibly
be resolved by appealing to the idea of political legitimacy. I want
to end these reflections with some support of my own for Professor Sunstein's doubt.
My support flows from a certain rough conception of what it
is for a judicial decision to be legitimate, a conception that I simply posit. I do not try to defend it here. According to the view I
have in mind, a judicial decision is legitimate if and only if the
parties and others see it as a competent and sincere attempt to
decide according to values, and only according to values, that
have approval or acceptance from institutions that are accountable, on a fair basis, to everyone in the country. We can call this
"democratic legitimacy." Advocates of adjudicative rule-formalism
sometimes claim that democratic legitimacy supports their
stance.' It is only, they suggest, if the judiciary sticks to enforcing
express positive legal norms, cast insofar as possible in rule-like
' See Scalia, 56 U Chi L Rev at 1176 (cited in note 1).
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form, that the parties and others can possibly perceive their decisions as having been driven by democratically approved values
and nothing else.
I do not see how this particular justification of adjudicative
rule-formalism can possibly succeed. Democratic legitimacy, remember, presupposes that we have assurance that the country's
positive lawmaking institutions are in fact accountable, on a fair
basis, to everyone in the country. But the view is widely held that
the fair accountability of lawmaking institutions to everyone implies that certain kinds of individual rights, and maybe needs,
are universally respected and fulfilled, and that the country's basic political and economic structure-its basic patterns of distribution of power and status-conform to certain limits on inequality, stratification, and subordination Of course, those rights,
needs, and limits, whatever they are, are what they are regardless of any democratic pedigree. They must be, because they are a
part of our conception of what democracy is.
If so, then the presumed fulfillment of these needs, rights,
and limits is preconditionalto any possible conclusion that adjudicative rule-formalism caters to democratic legitimacy. And it is
hard to see how their preconditional status can be reconciled with
any doctrine that would restrict judicial attention to norms and
values that visibly have received the approval of currently entrenched political institutions. Such a doctrine would blind the
law to the possibility that these institutions, or their manner of
operation, currently fail to give their dues to rights, needs, and
limits that really are preconditional to accountability, on a fair
basis, to everyone in the country. Which means, if our earlier
"anatomy" of adjudicative rule-formalism was on the mark, that
democratic legitimacy and adjudicative rule-formalism are adversaries no less than allies; or, in a banal rendition of the state of
affairs, that the relationship between the two is, as they say, conflicted. Imagine someone is shouting at your judiciary the following two instructions: (1) Focus only on expressly enacted legal
norms. Do not ever soften, leaven, or mix them with any considerations not themselves drawn from express enactments." (2) Act
only in response to values for which you can find and show positive approval by political institutions that really are accountable,
on a fair basis, to everyone in the country. The instructions appear to contradict each other.
' See, for example, Ronald Dworkin, Freedom'sLaw ch 1 (Harvard 1996); John Hart
Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard 1980); John Rawls, Political Liberalism 324-31
(Columbia 1993).
"0I am writing this just a few hours before the first night of Passover.
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Does this contradiction suffice to rule out the possibility of
democratically legitimate adjudicative rule-formalism? It does
not. Why? Because the possibility remains that an adjudicative
method might be rule-formalist even if it admitted into the adjudicative purview some considerations not specified by express
positive legal enactments. More specifically, the possibility remains that one can deduce from the very notion of "accountableon-a-fair-basis-to-everyone" a complete set of all the rules and
sub-rules that judges would need to resolve all of the controversies bearing on this matter that might ever come before them.
If you believe that is so, then you are a "formalist" in the second of the extravagant senses I listed at the outset of these remarks," the kind of formalist that Larry Alexander bemusedly
calls a "conceptualist." 2 But I gather, in part from Alexander's
essay, that sober and sensible rule-formalists shun conceptualism. Those who do, I am suggesting, cannot easily appeal to
democratic legitimacy as a reason to support across-the-board
adjudicative rule-formalism.
That is not, I freely grant, a conclusive reason to withhold
support from across-the-board adjudicative rule-formalism. The
sacrifice of democratic legitimacy might, after all, be a price you
are willing to pay for the anticipated pragmatic benefits.

' "Formalist" in the sense ofbelieving that legal-normative terms like "contract," "liberty," "fault," and "cause" are names of intelligible essences or pretending that the decisive
legal norms for any pending case are uniquely deducible from other norms in a logically
unified normative system.
12 Alexander, 66 U Chi L Rev at 531 n 2 (cited in note 3).

